Hannibal's Offensive Policy

That is, he mustiness piss assumed that operations under(a)taken to break up the trammel governance would either render a siege unnecessary, or mitigate the prospects of success in a siege at whatsoever(a) later date sufficiently to justify the expenditure of m and effort in a preliminary campaign against the alliance system.

In hindsight, Hannibal was plainly wrong. While it is impossible to say how a direct move against capital of Italy after Cannae might put up fared, his attack against the alliance system certainly failed in the abundant run. The alliance system was strained, but it did not break, or not to a sufficient degree for Hannibal to achieve his objectives. Hannibal's military, political, and moral specialness relative to Rome was probably never greater than without delay after Cannae. Thenceforth the "correlation of forces" and the initiative gradually swung to a greater extent and more toward Rome.

How and why that happened will be covered in detail in subsequent chapters dealing with that phase of the campaign. The nous immediately at hand is why Hannibal might ca-ca miscalculated at the outset--why, that is, he supposed that an attack on the roman type alliance system was his most productive course, and why it failed to extend him with the gains he must have looked for

Soon thereafter, the papists began to make treaties granting the same reciprocal rights to other cities, which thereof became "Latin" regardless of ethnimetropolis. Other forms of treaty came to grant change status to the partner state and its citizens, until in effect the Romans had a series of gradations of status available in their relations with variant allies. Because all of these treaties, like the new Latin treaties, were with Rome only, the Roman alliance system was not encumbered with any leagues or federations whose collective assent might be required for (and therefrom restrain) action on Rome's part. At the same time, the gradations of status provided a system of rewards and punishments that Rome could hold out to its allies.

A city that rebelled, or failed in its obligations, stood at risk of being prodigal to a less favorable status; a city that stood by Rome in a tough cutaneous senses stood to be rewarded with a more favorable status.

Rome under the kings was thus already a rather large and oecumenical city of its time, and a substantial regional power. This last must be doubly stressed because of the widespread assumption that has large(p) up in modern times that, previous to the Republic, Rome was under Etruscan rule, dominance, or at the least predominant ethnic influence. This assumption is based in part on the fact that the material culture of the Romans at this time, as indicated by archaeologic finds, was identical to that of the Etruscans, in part on the evident Etruscan emphasize of the Tarquinian kings, and in part on the presumption that in some way the Etruscans were the dominant power in central Italy in this period. However, the thesis of an "Etruscan Rome" exaggerates the significance of these points, and moreover flies square against the Romans' own later traditions. That the material culture of the Romans matched that of the Etruscans is clear, but it by no means so clear that this implies Etruscan cultural dominance, and in time less ov
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